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settled, however, that a corporation may be liable for a tort or wrongful act of its officer or agent, although the wrongful act is dependent
upon motive, intent or malice. 7 The master will be responsible for
the acts of the servant which were within the general scope of his
employment, while engaged in his master's business, and done with
a view toward furthering that business, whether the act be done negligently, wantonly or even willfully.8 The principle of immunity of
municipal corporations can find no justification in sound social policy
and is one that is productive of great injustice and hardship to individuals with but slight advantage to society. Loss and damage inflicted in the course of the operation of governmental institutions
ought obviously to be counted in the cost of government and carried
by society rather than that unfortunate individual upon whom the
loss accidentally falls.
R.K.

NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS ACT-ENFORCEMENT

AND RE-

VIEW OF ORDERs-APLICATION TO ADDUCE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE.
-In August, 1938, the petitioner, a Texas corporation, was ordered
by the National Labor Relations Board to cease and desist from unfair labor practices 1 and to take certain affirmative action.2 In June,
1939, the petitioner entered into a written stipulation with the Board
agreeing to obey the order except in so far as it related to back pay,
and the Board in turn agreed to accept such performance as suffiDec. 315 (1847), it was held that a corporation is not liable for a tortious act
committed willfully and maliciously by its servant, even though it was done
under orders from the president and general manager.
7 White v. International Textbook Co., 173 Iowa 192, 155 N. W. 298
(1915).
8 Mott v. Consumer's Ice Co., 73 N. Y. 543 (1878) ; Doscher v. Superior
Fire Proof Door and Sash Co., 221 App. Div. 63, 222 N. Y. Supp. 629 (1st
Dep't 1927).
1 Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act defines unfair labor practices by the employer. See 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 158 (Supp.
1941).
2 The order of the Board required the petitioner to cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in Oil Workers International Union, Local No.
227, or in any other labor organization, by discharging its employees or by
otherwise discriminating in regard to employment. (b) In any other manner
interfering with, restraining or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights
of self-organization, labor union membership, collective bargaining, etc. as
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. The affirmative directions of the order
were: (a) Offer to reinstate three employees found to have been discriminatorily discharged. (b) Pay them back pay for the period from the time of
discharge to date of reinstatement, less earnings during such period. (c) Post
appropriate notices at its Texas City refinery where the alleged unfair labor
practices had been committed.
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cient compliance with its order. However, the petitioner never
obeyed the affirmative directions of the order, whereupon in April,
1940, the Board filed its petition with the Circuit Court of Appeals
for enforcement of the order. 3 About four months thereafter, the
petitioner made application to the court to adduce additional evidence
before the Board 4 which, it contended, should relieve it from complying with the order. The application stated that subsequent to the
entry of the Board's order, the petitioner disposed of all its assets to
its four stockholders as a liquidating dividend; that it had dissolved
and that the two stockholders who received the Texas City refinery
where the unfair labor practices allegedly took place, conveyed it to
a newly formed Delaware corporation whose stockholders were at no
time stockholders of the Texas corporation. While this application
was pending, the petitioner filed an answer to the Board's enforcement proceeding, praying that the petition be dismissed on the ground
that it had been dissolved. The Circuit Court of Appeals sustained
the Board's order,5 thereby denying, in effect, the petitioner's application to adduce additional evidence. On certiorarito the Supreme
Court, held, affirmed, two justices dissenting. Southport Petroleum
Company v. N. L. R. B, 314 U. S. -, 62 Sup. Ct. 452 (1942).
An application for leave to adduce additional evidence is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. It is not a matter of
right. The application must show two things: (1) that the additional evidence is material and (2) that there were reasonable grounds
for failure to adduce it in the hearing before the Board. To be material, the additional evidence must tend to rebut the propriety of the
order by showing lack of due process. Hence, if the additional evidence has no such tendency, or if the application is made in bad faith
for the purpose of delaying enforcement of the Board's order, the
application will be denied. 6
In the instant case, the additional evidence failed to meet these
849 STAT.

453 (1936), 29 U. S. C. A. § 160 (Supp. 1941).

449 STAT. 453 (1936), 29 U. S. C. A. § 160(e) (Supp. 1941):

****

If

either party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence and shall show to the satisfaction of the court that such evidence is
material and that there were reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such
evidence in the hearing before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, the
court may order such additional evidence to be taken before the Board, its
member, agent, or agency, and to be made a part of the transcript * * *."
5N. L. R. B. v. Southport Petroleum Co., 117 F. (2d) 90 (C. C. A. 5th,
1941). The Circuit Court of Appeals held that, conceding that dissolution of
the corporation took place, it would have no effect on the enforcement of the

Board's order because under the Texas statutes, Articles 1388-1390, 3 Vernon's
Texas Annotated Civil Statutes, a corporation upon dissolution, is continued in
existence for a period of three years for the purpose of suing and being sued.
6 Berkshire Employees Ass'n of gerkshire Knitting Mills v. N. L. R B.,
121 F. (2d) 235 (C. C. A.-3d, 1941); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. N. L. P, B.,
120 F. (2d) 641 (App. D. C. 1941); N. L. R B. v. Aluminum Products Co.,
120 F. (2d) 567 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941); N. L. R B. v. Sunshine Mining Co.,

110 F. (2d) 780 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940).
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tests, the court holding that the evidence in the application was immaterial. The bare allegations that the Texas corporation had discontinued operations, and that the refinery was taken over by the
Delaware corporation whose stockholders were never stockholders
of the Texas corporation, did not negative the possibility that the
stock in the Delaware corporation represented but an insubstantial
part of its total capitalization, with the balance and real control held
by the Texas corporation or by nominal or "dummy" holders. Operation might have been carried on under a disguise intended to evade
the order, without any change of actual ownership, or any bonvz fide
dissolution. At any rate, these matters were addressed to the discretion of the reviewing court and this court has found that the allegations in the petitioner's application did not overcome these possibilities. In addition, the court stated that the Board's order ran not
only to the petitoner, but also to its "officers, agents, successors and
assigns", 7 and in view of the fact that the petitioner has not shown
that there was a change in its relation to the refinery, the order of
the Board, even with respect to its affirmative directions, may be
sustained on that ground.
P. F. C.

SALEs-FAcToRs' ACT-PLEDGE OF RING WITH PAWNBROKER
BY DEALER TO WHOM IT WAS DELIVERED BY ANOTHER DEALER ON

MEMoRA-DuM.-One Gouldon, a factor, received a ring from the
plaintiff, a jeweler, under a memorandum agreement which expressly
reserved title in the plaintiff and further provided that title should not
pass until the plaintiff should be apprised of a selection. The factor
pledged the ring with the defendant, a pawnbroker who took the
ring in good faith, and appropriated the proceeds. In an action by
the plaintiff to recover the ring or its value, the Appellate Division'
held that the defendant is precluded from establishing by parol evidence a custom whereby delivery to a factor or agent was for the
purpose of sale and thus to enable the defendant to come within the
protection of the Factors' Act; 2 on the grounds that by adding in his
7This is the usual form of order. See N. L. R. B. v. Link Belt Co., 311
U. S. 584, 61 Sup. Ct 358 (1941) ; N. L. R. B. v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,
309 U. S.206, 60 Sup. Ct -493 (1940) ; N. L. R B. v. Falk Corp., 308 U. S.
453, 60 Sup. Ct 307 (1940); N. L. R. B. v. Newport News Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Co., 308 U. S.241, 60 Sup. Ct 203 (1939) ; Consolidated Edison Co.

v. N. L. R. B., 305 U. S.197, 59 Sup. Ct. 206 (1938).
1
Mann v. R. Simpson & Co., Inc., 257 App. Div. 329, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 423
(1st Dep't 1939).
2N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 43: "Every factor or agent entrusted with the
possession of * * * any merchandise for the puipose of sale * * * shall be the
true owner thereof, so far as to give validity to any contract made by such

